I’m just sitting here hoping that one of these new exploits lets me put OpenWRT on my closed source eap610. I had one model working great so bought another, but they revised it to disallow easy command prompt updates like the old version. They also updated it to disallow serial command updates, which is what the forums said should work.
good that i’m using caddy
On the bright side, nobody in the company ever took me seriously when I talked about security, but now they seem more willing to hear me out 🤷
Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I’ve seen in this thread:
Fewer Letters More Letters MECO Main Engine Cut-Off ~ MainEngineCutOff podcast SECO Second-stage Engine Cut-Off nginx Popular HTTP server
[Thread #171 for this comm, first seen 19th Nov 2026, 17:30] [FAQ] [Full list] [Contact] [Source code]
WHY do all new vulnerabilities have to use this inane naming scheme? These are grown-up problems. Can we use grown-up names?
If someone finds another vulnerability in Nginx that gives root access, will it be called NGINX3root or NGINX2root2?
(Yes, I know this is a petty complaint)
NGINX2:AI Boogaloo
Nginx4 GettinGRooted
will it be called NGINX3root
Only if the next one targets http3 instead of http2 😉
this one is targeting http3 too
We’ve been swarmed with these for the last few months, but the catchy names are useful to spread awareness easier. You’ll never see a headline on mainstream news “CVE-20261213-69420” but maybe you’ll see Spectre, log4j, or my new fave *sshole
Nginxroot3: Tokyo drift
Nginxroot360
Unscoped.
Nah, only Microsoft vulnerabilities can end with 36x (it was only 365 before though)
2nginx2root2you
You’re right, at the least the name should have the year in it so that we know if it’s a new vulnerability or an old one.
And since a product can have multiple vulnerabilities in the same year we should have a number that increments with each new vulnerability found.
Also, since one vulnerability can affect multiple products (eg. a vulnerability in a library), we can’t use the product names to identify the vulnerability (as that could be quite a long list). We will just use the acronym for our naming scheme so that we can distinguish our list of numbers from other lists of numbers like book ISBNs or ICQ numbers.
We could call our naming scheme the Cool Vulnerability Eponym.
So the vulnerability name would end up as something like
CVE-2026-123456.Lol, nice backronym! CVEs are great! They’re not very scannable in headlines, though. For that I would actually prefer product name to be involved. Just maybe not written as a Fast and Furious movie title.
They’ve done studies that more attention is given to vulnerabilities that have catchy names (since they can be reported on) than CVE-2026-42069.
This is a much more descriptive name than SPECTRE or MELTDOWN though. I’ll take this scheme any day of the week.
I suspect it’s because most of the new crop of vulnerabilities have been discovered by AI companies and those companies need press coverage. Seems like all of these ‘x2root’ issues are, at best, dependent on uncommon or ill-advised setups, or depend on extremely unlikely events actually to get RCE.
I’m on the verge of just ignoring them all. Which, maybe that’s phase 1 of the plan to pwn the entire internet.
2NGINX2root, followed by NGINX root: Tokyo Drift.
Just fyi, the nginx vulnerabilities are all impractical to use. The bugs are use after free, which will almost definitely lead to a crash in the worker process and have them be restarted.
That itself would make it about as bad as the mp-tcp style expoits lately, but it’s even weaker. If you could keep trying, you could strap an llm into figuring out a specific machine and after tons of compute eventually get out data or take controll of the nginx-owned process.
But, the restarts should restart that process, so I don’t see almost any risk unless you have address randomization disabled, which would be highly unusual.Unless I am missing something here, I see a bigger risk with an unmentioned loop that was also fixed in nginx. That one lets you make a worker thread hang, so you can disable a server until someone notices and restarts nginx. That ddos affects servers with tls1.3 support.
Also their “2root” is just a completely unrelated kernel bug they bundled for marketing, which is pissing me off tbh. All of this “security research” for marketing is the worst possible contradictory incentive. You wanna release as poorly as possible to maximize fear mongering.
They didn’t even release the bug, for all we know is as convoluted to use as the mp-tcp stuff and affects basically noone. Not that the nginx side is exploitable.Yeah, clearly the “2root” part has nothing to do with nginx. However, given how quickly linux privescs are dropping these days, I think that even on fully patched systems it’s only a matter of time before any shell turns into root. Also, upgrading the kernel requires a reboot, and many server operators are quite reluctant to reboot there boxes in fear of breaking something. Plenty of servers are running an outdated kernel
I’ve stopped considering Linux users or containers as any kind of security boundary a few months ago
Even calling this “nginx2shell” would be very clickbaity. This isn’t a realistically usable attack. Only one exploit can ever be a “2shell” for any software, it should be a once in a decade vulnerability getting that name. Even if it was escalatable, and even if it didn’t require extensive resources for every exploitation, it’d steíll depend on only semi-common configuration. Nothing deserving of “2shell” on multiple levels.
With the privesc, I would look into that again. I got the impression we were through the major escalation pathways, and now have increasingly convoluted and less plausible leftovers being reported.
Even if they report 1k garbage exploits at once, that’s still not gonna do much for any actual real-world risk to normal hosters.
Given the marketing they do when something is even theoretically plausible as an escallation, and given the worst I recall hearing recently was one of the tcp ones that only “worked” for sandbox, container, and vm escape (and ofc user to root), I don’t think we have that many more left. Maybe ai companies are holding a few back for another big press release or two, we’ll see. If this bundled root exploit turns out to be a major dud, I doubt they have much material left.AI companies have an interest to embed the general sentiment that ai exploitation is growing exponentially, and the only way forward is to buy ai and keep testing and developing software with it to protect from ai attacks ahead of time.
But in practice in the existing fields ai was introduced to, there was a saturation. Initial gains when making ai capable of working in the field and it then jumping from a few categories to most inside that field. and then some more for more specific training for the tasks, and then not much past that.We had a few classes of bugs AI was suddenly very capable at finding. We probably got all the faulty page handling in spring, then various use after free and general memory handling bugs. We’ll probably get ai implementing existing testing suites more widely across software. Like how the 4-cert was found by just running the normal testing tool on some random cert companies obscure intermediate certs, or how some basic sanity checks found the musl ssh password thing.
Once memory saftey has been improved to the level current llms can understand, and basic security tests have been written for software, we might extend this to continuously more obscure software but eventually there’d not be much more to report.My expectation is AI companies are stockpiling the stuff they have, releasing it on a schedule and with marketing that suggest an ever worsening problem, and then hope enough people buy ai products that they can then blame the sudden reduction on ai found problems on the new ai testing.
To be fair, this is a bit conspiritorial, but even taking the exact opposite view, there’s still only so many bugs to find. If you think ai will keep growing in bug finding ability, then at some point they’ll find all, and the open weight models will also find all, and then eventually this all becomes a unit test that runs before stuff gets pushed.
In my own expected scenario where llms are good at basic memory safety and logic bugs, that’s equally be the end result. Using some specialized local model as a compile-time check stand-in for something like the rust borrow checker or lean logic checker for languages that suffer from shit memory protections (looking at C++) or encourage bad logic patterns (looking at basically anything other than proof checkers and maybe rust).
Thank god I’m running IIS 5.
I will get into your network and send you netsend messages!
I’m running IIS 5.
But why?
The S stands for Secure.
Internet Ixplorer Secure
I am root. 🪵
Ruh roh rooby!










